Patriotic Dissent

  Copyright © 2020 by Daniel A. Sjursen

  All rights reserved. No portion of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from Heyday.

  Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

  Names: Sjursen, Daniel A., author.

  Title: Patriotic dissent : America in the age of endless war / Daniel A.

  Sjursen.

  Other titles: America in the age of endless war

  Description: Berkeley, California : Heyday, [2020] | Includes

  bibliographical references.

  Identifiers: LCCN 2020017750 (print) | LCCN 2020017751 (ebook) | ISBN

  9781597145145 (cloth) | ISBN 9781597145220 (ebook)

  Subjects: LCSH: Sjursen, Daniel A. | War--Moral and ethical aspects--United

  States. | Military ethics--United States. | Dissenters--United States. |

  United States--Military policy. | United States--Armed

  Forces--Officers--Political activity. | United States--Armed

  Forces--Political activity. | Patriotism--United States.

  Classification: LCC UA22 .S58 2020 (print) | LCC UA22 (ebook) | DDC

  172/.420973--dc23

  LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020017750

  LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020017751

  Cover Design: Ashley Ingram

  Interior Design/Typesetting: Ashley Ingram

  Published by Heyday

  P.O. Box 9145, Berkeley, California 94709

  (510) 549-3564

  heydaybooks.com

  10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

  To Mae and Joe “Bubsy” Peteley

  Prologue

  November 2006. Just south of Baghdad, Iraq.

  It took me exactly one patrol to turn against the war in Iraq. To be more specific, it all unfolded on the first independent mission I led as a scout platoon leader assigned to the Third Squadron, Sixty-First Cavalry Regiment, of the storied Second Infantry Division. My beloved second platoon rolled out the gate of Camp Rustamiyah in southeast Baghdad that day in a single file of four HMMWV gun trucks on a basic “presence patrol”: a vague, if ubiquitous, attempt to “show the flag” and exude a sense of security in a country then wracked by devastating sectarian civil war. There were nineteen of us in those inadequately armored vehicles. My seasoned veteran platoon sergeant was thirty-six years of age, the “daddy” of the platoon; none of the other troopers were older than twenty-eight. The average age was about twenty. I commanded, though I was all of twenty-three.

  We turned right out of the gate and headed south, crossed the Diyala River, and proceeded along the aptly code-named Route “Wild.” Matters deteriorated rather quickly. Halfway to the first of the populated villages—often labeled “suburbs” of Baghdad, though they bore little resemblance to the ones in New York’s Westchester County that I envied from afar as a child in Staten Island—a small improvised explosive device (IED) prematurely exploded just meters in front of our lead vehicle. The insurgent “triggerman” had mistimed the detonation before fleeing. As always, we never saw or found him. Just as we’d been trained to do in the scrublands of Colorado and deserts of California, we halted, set a security cordon, and “exploited” the blast site: we took pictures of the crater, traced the “command” (detonation) wire, and checked the vehicles for damage. The whole affair lasted maybe fifteen minutes and was both terrifying and exhilarating. I’d—we’d—seen combat; we were warriors now! Oh, the stories we’d be able to tell in garrison town taverns when the deployment was over.

  All of this and more crossed my mind. Still, I was an officer and had to think practically, too. There were so many questions: Who planted the bomb? Which sect, militia, or insurgent group did he belong to? Where did he run off to? Where did he or they store the bombs? How did the civilians know to avoid the (conspicuously empty) area? Were such attacks to be a regular feature of daily patrols? What if the blast hadn’t missed? For most of these I had no answers, and neither the superior officers nor the leaders of the unit we’d replaced seemed to have any useful advice. What was certain was that someone, or some part of the Iraqi populace, hated us—enough to kill us. Even for a West Point–trained professional soldier, this was a profound and disturbing realization. Shit was about to get real.

  So on we rolled southward towards the historic, ancient city of Salman Pak, once the capital of the ancient Seleucid (Greek) and Sassanid (Persian) empires. About a mile out I heard the distinct sound of gunshots in the distance, several pops in succession—pistol fire. Picking up the radio hand mic, I ordered the lead vehicle, immediately to my front, to pick up the pace and, in classic Indian Wars cavalry fashion, race to the “sound of the guns.” What we found was a macabre reminder that the US Army occupied a nation locked in a brutal civil war. Two Iraqi teens were sprawled on the pavement. One’s brains were leaking out; the other had a couple of holes in his upper chest. Somehow, both were still breathing. I yelled for my medic, and Doc, as we called him, rushed forward. Before Doc could get to the teen with the head wound—and because my own inexperience precluded my gaining control of the site and situation—the gathering crowd of locals tossed him into a makeshift ambulance, which proceeded to pull away without the other wounded kid. We’d later learn he died within minutes.

  Our medic kneeled beside me over the teen with the chest wounds, but before he could render aid, Doc vomited and began to shake uncontrollably. In the many months that followed he’d prove a steady, competent medic and treat many of our own often seriously wounded troopers, but this was his first real-life victim. Almost immediately, another soldier, who’d been considered a screwup back at home station but also once worked as an EMT, stepped up and began treatment. It wouldn’t be the last time this soon-to-be-decorated trooper saved the day with his medical know-how. Once the field dressing was applied, a few of my other guys loaded the quickly fading teen into the back of my HMMWV. Everyone mounted up, and we pulled a U-turn and sped back north.

  I hadn’t clearly thought through the next step, running as I was on instinct and adrenaline. I knew kids who toted pistols back home in my neighborhood of Staten Island, but for the most part these served as props for play gangsters. I’d never seen someone shot before, but I knew viscerally that the bloody mess in my backseat looked bad. Wounded local nationals—lifeless army code for Iraqi civilians—weren’t technically supposed to be brought to or treated at US military base aid stations. But I’d studied the maps and I knew there weren’t any operational civilian hospitals in the area, and none was closer than our forward operating base (FOB). And this kid wasn’t going to make it without higher-level treatment—and fast.

  So I made a few frantic radio calls to headquarters requesting an exception so I could drive the casualty through the gate and to the unit aid station. I received a series of denials, then equivocations, and finally silence. To hell with it, I thought—we’re coming in! By now the gravely wounded teen was audibly wheezing. It was just about the most awful sound I’d ever heard. Past the gate we wound and screeched down the dusty base roads to the aid station, a rear-echelon sergeant—we pejoratively called such noncombat soldiers “FOBBITS” for being ensconced in the safety of forward operating bases, and in reference to the Lord of the Rings movies—screaming “Slow down!” at us along the way. After my truck came to a halt, I helped carry the victim up the ramp to the aid station. Within a minute the physician’s assistant on duty pronounced the teen dead. So I walked out to the trucks, sat against my wheel, and shared a few cigarettes with my sergeants. There was blood on my hands, my fatigue blouse, even my belt. The
n we loaded back up, on my insistence, and drove back to the scene of the crime. I found the father, broke the news, watched him cry, and accepted his gracious—staggeringly polite, without resentment—offer of tea.

  It had been my first independent patrol. Welcome to Iraq. If only I knew that within a month such a mission wouldn’t even be considered a tough one. Perhaps it’s better I didn’t. What exactly had unfolded that day, and what did it all mean? It turned out the dead teens had been cousins. To hustle a buck in an impoverished community within a larger collapsed national economy, they had engaged in the roadside sale of black-market gasoline by the gallon jug. They were Sunnis—one of the two warring sects of Islam—although, like many Iraqis, they weren’t from a particularly religious family. On that particularly unlucky day, a carload of opposing Shia militiamen—themselves probably teens or young men—had pulled up, hopped out, and proceeded to open fire on the strangers simply because the targets were Sunni.

  These small-scale gangland murders, on both sides of the divide, were remarkably common by November 2006, three and a half years into the American occupation of Iraq. My unit, which departed Fort Carson, Colorado, in October, had the misfortune of entering the war at the statistical height of sectarian strife. The young victims I’d discovered that day were just 2 of the 3,095 civilians in the bloodiest month of the bloodiest year of the entire war.1

  I never felt the same about the mission at hand, the US Army, or my country in general after that day. It wasn’t a clean break, so to speak, nor was it an immediate political sea change. Such matters are rarely so neat. Rather, it was perhaps the first of many waypoints on my own complex, nonlinear road to public antiwar dissent. Not all that long before, as a burgeoning neoconservative and George W. Bush admirer, I’d entered Iraq with some doubts about the viability and efficacy, if not the morality and legality, of the war. It wasn’t going well, after all.

  Though senior Bush administration officials had billed the invasion and occupation as a “cakewalk”2 that would “pay for itself,”3 within scant months of the president’s “Mission Accomplished”4 announcement a Sunni-based nationalist insurgency broke out. The next year, Shia militiamen joined the fracas, and the Sunni side drifted increasingly towards sectarian Islamism, previously an almost unknown force in fiercely secular Iraqi society. Then in 2005, in response to the calculated bombing of Shia mosques, the civil war that the Sunni jihadis (soon to coalesce under the banner of Al Qaeda in Iraq) hoped for kicked off. The following year, the resultant maelstrom would reach its gruesome climax. It was into this seemingly apocalyptic chaos that my platoon drove on that fateful day in late November 2006.

  Always an avid reader and follower of current events, I knew all this gruesome backstory as I boarded the off-brand charter plane to Kuwait, en route to Iraq, just a month earlier. It disturbed me. In fact, I’d read Thomas Ricks’s then-popular bombshell critique of the Iraq War’s lead-up and early years, Fiasco, over my two-week home leave just prior to deployment. I’d later learn that our squadron commander, the lieutenant colonel in charge of the five-hundred-man unit, had read the very same book at almost the exact same time. This too raised doubts in me about the prospects for victory in a war that was now mine to wage, and (more discomfiting) even the wisdom of invading Iraq in the first place. I knew, too, that US military casualties, particularly in and around Baghdad, were skyrocketing. The month we hit the ground, 111 American soldiers had been killed and nearly ten times that number wounded.5 I wondered how this could be sustainable for an all-volunteer US military struggling even to meet recruiting goals in a war with no conceivable end in sight.

  As I tossed and turned during the night after the patrol, I kept running the events of the day through my head. I couldn’t shake all the questions and their fearsome implications long enough for anything but the most fitful sleep, despite knowing I had to rise early and do it all over again in the morning. This much seemed obvious: my unit—and thus my army and country—was clearly both voyeur and participant in a bloody ethno-religious civil war. We could expect to be attacked by one or both sides of that conflict, as well as to police and collect the refuse of the intercommunal bloodletting. The insurgency was multifaceted, the insurgents difficult to discern, and their tactics unconventional. Even if we could defeat (but what would that even mean, in practice?) one side of the bipolar insurgency, what of the other? And, if, somehow, we managed to miraculously suppress both sides, could we halt the civil war and secure the people in their respective communities? I knew for sure that none of us were really trained for that.

  I was twenty-three years old, less than eighteen months past my West Point graduation. I was no defeatist, no liberal, no pacifist, and certainly no kind of dissenter. I still wanted to believe, with all my heart. I was proud of what I did, thrilled to put the uniform on each day; I adored my soldiers and truly thought what we did was special—to such an extent that the sentiment bordered on self-righteousness. Nevertheless, I couldn’t shake the doubts that night, and everything I was to see in the days, weeks, and months ahead—in what would be unexpectedly extended into a fifteen-month tour—only added to those apprehensions. It was after witnessing my first fruitless murder, looking back, that I first indelibly knew the US military couldn’t win in Iraq. That’s as far as my skepticism went at the time. It would take the combination of these new on-the-ground experiences with my oldest love, books, to drive me towards outright opposition.

  Every book, of course, has an author (or, as in the case of Donald Trump’s bestseller, a ghostwriter6). But we authors can be a rather self-righteous and therefore suspect lot. One should always be skeptical when we explain what makes our particular work so timely and valuable. Perhaps the greatest sardonic social critic of my grandparents’ generation noted at the very end of his life:

  There is a tragic flaw in our precious Constitution, and I don’t know what can be done to fix it. This is it: Only nut cases want to be president. This was true even in high school. Only clearly disturbed people ran for class president.7

  Well, maybe only wildly self-important people want—or think themselves interesting enough—to write a book. Count me as guilty as the rest of the literary crew. So here’s a crack at why this one needed writing.

  Americans today live in an age of vapid overadulation of their soldiers. They don’t, the vast majority of them, want to actually join the army, the navy, the air force, the marine corps, or even the coast guard. That’d be hard, inconvenient, and, after decades of indeterminate wars, potentially dangerous! No, almost pathologically obsessively “thanking” service members and veterans serves three purposes. The first is a feeling of deep-seated obligation (maybe) to right the perceived wrong regarding how the last generation of troopers, from the Vietnam War, were treated. Mind you, serious scholars have long noted the significant exaggeration of the “spitting image” of Vietnam veteran treatment—the notion that most were literally spit on upon return.8 Suffice it to say that while some troopers back then were undoubtedly disrespected—certainly at higher rates than this generation of veterans—large segments of society, usually majorities, supported not only the Vietnam War but also its participants until surprisingly late in the conflict.

  That said, the second motivation for the often (though, admittedly, not always) vacuous gratitude is a sense of conscience-soothing embarrassment. Most Americans know full well that less than 1 percent of their fellow citizens serve on active duty and that they themselves chose not to do so. While by no means an accusatory slander, this is a simple, if uncomfortable, truth. Consider it a fact of life in a society that decided some fifty years ago to ditch its (usual) tradition of citizen-soldiering in times of large or extended wars and opted for an (ostensibly) all-volunteer, professionalized, standing military.9 In such a culture as America’s in the first decades of the twenty-first century, “thanking” veterans at sporting events, airports, or local chain restaurants feels—in the gut of the self-selected civilian—like the right or, at le
ast, the requisite thing to do.

  Finally, the societal veneer of what now truly amounts to soldier worship is driven by another salient factor: Americans have been told to do so. Remember what then-President George W. Bush told the nation’s citizenry, soon after the 9/11 attacks and just as he unleashed the US military on an expansive series of ultimately forever wars—not that they must collectively sacrifice, or flood their local recruiting stations, but “get down to Disney World in Florida . . . . Take your families and enjoy life, the way we want it to be enjoyed.”10 The military only modestly grew in size over the ensuing years, and even when some two hundred thousand service members—most of them soldiers, some marines—were deployed to combat zones at the height of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, income taxes were never raised, conscription was never considered, and instead the same professional “warriors” simply served tour after tour in harm’s way.

  This, what I’ve described, is what generally counts for “patriotism” these days: “thank” the troops, “love” America (or at least its gilded symbols), pay your historically modest11 (despite the conservative hype) taxes, and—here’s the key—keep your mouth shut. Nothing is being asked of you, materially or physically, so just politely champion the soldiers, wave a flag, and support the foreign policies of what’s obviously—compared to those evil “terrorists” over there—a reasonably well-intentioned government. Only there’s a catch: step outside those lines, take a rare interest in the nation’s wars, and then, well, mister, get ready to reap the whirlwind. Expect pejorative labels like “hippie,” “tree hugger,” “un-American,” “traitor,” and/or the latest favorite: “Russian asset.”12

  That applies, ironically, even to the hyperadulated soldiers and veterans, of whom the prevailing culture demands near worship, if they dare open their mouths to tell something besides war stories (those are encouraged) and criticize or oppose the wars they fought. That’s another problematic discipline buried in the fine print of the all-volunteer force concept: since military and combat service is a personal choice, even multitour veterans should expect to reap what they sow. Heck, this is fanatic personal-responsibility, up-by-the-bootstraps, capitalist America, right? Turn publicly antiwar and you’re likely to hear the now ubiquitous retort: “Hey, quite complaining; you volunteered, remember?”